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Abstract. This article describes some problems with a recent analysis of global terrorism issued by the
United States Department of State.
The United States (US) Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism has recently been issued to
shed light on what some term a scourge for human civilization. Yet the report may provide neither light
nor heat.
One conclusion of the report is that there has been a significant shift from state-sponsored terrorism to
terrorism sponsored by "far-flung and loosely structured webs of terror." Is this really the case? Statesponsored terrorism has long developed, nurtured, and supported webs of terror--far flung, loosely
structured, and otherwise. This state sponsorship has been overt, covert, and clandestine. So what has
changed? Are states less in the terrorism business than before? Are they covering their tracks in a more
sophisticated fashion? Here the report is not helpful.
Another conclusion of the report is that there has been a shift from politically motivated terrorism to
terrorism motivated by religion and ideology. But is not political motivation imbued with ideology and is
not ideology constituted with a political world view and a political world even beyond the material
world? And does not a religious belief structure qualify as well as ideology--an ideology that impels
political belief and action? As well, does not any political ideology serve the purpose to varying degrees
of a religion in and of the material world? Moreover, the report does not even cover the psychological
fact that some significant portion of terrorists act purely out of malign affective complexes of revenge
and hatred--others out of the desire for pure economic profit or even a sense of cultural relativism and
nihilism. So what--if anything--has really changed?
A third conclusion is that the primary source of terrorist threat to the US seems to be located in the
Middle East. Yet quantitative research suggests that specific terrorist attacks to US targets have
occurred more often outside the Middle East. This may suggest that the primary source is still the
Middle East but the source's agents operate elsewhere. However--as far as can be determined from
unclassified data--the sources of acts effected elsewhere often seem to be located regionally proximal
to the acts. Alternatively, has the US been much more successful at preventing terrorist acts whose
origins lie in the Middle East? But this is an hypothesis that requires corroboration.
One could conclude from analyzing the report's conclusions that little has changed or even that little is
accurate. Why might this be? Reports on terrorism help us manage terror. That is, the very act of
providing conclusions about a phenomenon can seem to render that phenomenon easier to control and
manage and influence. Unfortunately, success in the latter can render terrorism more successful--i.e.,
with the seeds of psychological victory one may reap physical defeat. (See Florian, V., & Mikulincer, M.
(1997). Fear of death and the judgment of social transgressions: A multidimensional test of terror
management theory. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 73, 369-380; On-the-Record Briefing on
the 1999 Annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" Report. (May 1, 2000). As released by the Office of the
Spokesman, U.S. Department of State at
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http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000501a.html; Patterns of Global Terrorism. (April
2000). Department of State Publication 10687 at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/1999index.html; Pyszczynski, T., &
Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1997). Why do we need what we need? A terror management perspective
on the roots of human social motivation. Psychological Inquiry, 8, 1-20; Wicklund, R. (1997). Terror
management accounts of other theories: Questions for the cultural worldview concept. Psychological
Inquiry, 8, 54-58.) (Keywords: Terrorism; United States Department of State.)
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